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Dirty Words and Dirty Politics: Cognitive
Dissonance in the First Amendment
Two kinds of speech that traditionally have not been accorded first
amendment protection are libel and obscenity.' Before 1964, libel law
had developed a series of intricate rules designed to compensate dam-
aged reputations and at the same time to allow specified classes of
expression to pass untrammelled. However, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,2 the Supreme Court subjected the common law tests for libel
to the scrutiny of the first amendment, 3 adding the element of intent
to what had previously been a two part test encompassing falsity and
harm to reputation. The effect of the decision was to give more com-
plete protection to those criticizing the government in print and, at
the same time, to define narrowly the exceptions to that protection by
which a plaintiff might recover damages for defamation.
In obscenity law, as developed since 1957, the Court employed a
somewhat similar three part test4 to pare away from communications
dealing candidly with sex those materials which were deemed obscene
and without any redeeming social importance. Beginning with Roth
v. United States,5 the Court struck a constitutional balance between the
positive social value of discussions of sex and the ill effect that such
materials might have on society. In the spring of 1966, however, the
Court in three obscenity decisions6 set about reordering the balance in
order to make more precise the standards set out in Roth and subse-
quent cases. As in Times, the key to rebalancing was the element of
defendant's intent. The use of the intent element in these cases, how-
1 See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution,
38 MINN. L. RaV. 295 (1954).
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3 "[Libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must
be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment." Id. at 269.
4 The test required -that the materials in question be "patently offensive," that they
appeal to "prurient interest," and that the seller have had some knowledge of the
obscenity of his merchandise. See text accompanying notes 42-63 infra.
5 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
6 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463
(1966); Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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ever, was markedly different from the use of intent in Times and in
previous obscenity cases; much confusion has followed.7
I. THE MULTI-THRESHOLD TEST IN LIBEL
At common law, two discrete elements are necessary to a cause of
action for libel: the writings must be false8 and defamatory of the
plaintiff. The defendant has the burden of proving the truth of any
defamatory remarks as legal justification for their publication.9 Since
the harm against which libel law guards is injury to plaintiff's reputa-
tion'Q-his character as others view him-mere falsity is not sufficient
to make out a case.11 The plaintiff must also show that the statements
taken as a whole12 defame him in the eyes of others, that they tend to
hold him up to hatred, ridicule, or contempt. 13
7 See, e.g., Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup. Cr. RFv. 7; The
Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966); Note, Obscenity and the Supreme
Court: Nine Years of Confusion, 19 STAN. L. REv. 167 (1966); Note, More Ado About Dirty
Books, 75 YA.E L.J. 1364 (1966); 44 TaxAs L. REv. 1382 (1966).
8 This element originally applied to civil libel only. The English rule that truth is no
defense in criminal libel was first adopted in this country in People v. Croswell, 3 Johns.
Cas. 337 (N.Y. 1804). Statutes in nearly every state since have changed the rule. See also
note 37 infra.
9 The defense of truth must extend to all defamatory imputations drawn from the
publication. "Substantial," not literal, truth is required. See, e.g., Bell Publishing Co. v.
Garrett Engineering Co., 154 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
10 In describing the harm function of defamation, Professor Emerson, who distinguishes
between words and actions in determining what the government may constitutionally
regulate, says: "Mhe injury, at least in substantial part, does not flow from action result-
ing from the communication-action which can be intercepted by regulation addressed
specifically to it-but directly from the communication itself. In this sense, therefore, true
private defamation tends toward the category of 'action,' and hence is subject to reason-
able regulation." Emerson, supra note 1, at 922.
11 Examples of the principle that even lies must be defamatory include Kimmerle v.
New York Evening Journal, 262 N.Y. 99, 186 N.E. 217 (1933) (woman "courted by a
murderer'); Cohen v. New York Times Co., 153 App. Div. 242, 138 N.Y.S. 206 (1912) (man
is dead); Pogany v. Chambers, 206 Misc. 933, 134 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (brother of
a Communist).
In addition, words used in anger are often not actionable. See, e.g., Hansen v. Dethridge,
67 N.Y.S.2d 168 (N.Y. City Ct. 1946) (accusation of libel); Tomakian v. Fritz, 75 R.I. 496,
67 A.2d 834 (1949) ("drunken driver'); Morrissette v. Beatte, 66 R.I. 73, 17 A.2d 464 (1941)
(accusation of sodomy).
12 Statements that are clearly meant to be humorous and are so taken by readers would
not be actionable, while a seemingly innocent statement may be devastating to the
plaintiff, as in Braun v. Armour & Co., 254 N.Y. 514, 173 N.E. 845 (1930), where plaintiff
was said to have sold bacon in his store. Plaintiff was a kosher meat dealer.
13 See generally GREGoY & KALVEN, CASES ON ToRrs 947, 968-73 (1959); PRossER, TORTS
§ 106 (3d ed. 1964); Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HAv. L. REV. 875, 892-
901 (1956). The statements need not be regarded as defamatory by a majority of the
recipients, but only by "a considerable and respectable class in the community." Peck v.
Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
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The two elements of falsity and defamatory harm satisfied, plaintiff's
case is complete.14 Libel law in a majority of jurisdictions does not
require proof of an element of intent or negligence; 15 absolute liability
is the standard. 6 However, in raising a defense of privilege, the de-
fendant may open up the question of his intent. Two categories of
privilege may be pleaded by a defendant, defeasible and absolute,' 7
but only for the former is intent relevant.
Defeasible privilege is most important in the freedom it gives journal-
ists and other critics in their discussions of public figures and public
issues.' 8 The "fair comment" rule grants a qualified privilege to dis-
cussion not only of politicians and public officials, 19 but also of writers,20
14 At common law, the jury is allowed to infer general damages from the defamatory
nature of the remarks. However, in jurisdictions employing the distinction between libel
per se (writings defamatory on their face) and libel per quod (writings defamatory in the
light of extrinsic facts), special damages (pecuniary loss) must be proved for the latter.
See, e.g., Rose v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 213 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1954); O'Connell v.
Press Publishing Co., 214 N.Y. 352, 108 N.E. 556 (1915); Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell
Law Directory, Inc., 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400 (1936). See generally GREGORY & KALVEN,
supra note 12, at 912-82; Developments, supra note 12, at 889-91.
15 A minority exception in cases concerning the defamation of public figures, including
candidates for public office, was established in Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98
Pac. 281 (1908), discussed in note 36 infra. The Times case turned this into a constitu-
tionally required exception. See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
16 The early common law required an element of malice, but in Bromage v. Prosser, 4
B. & C. 247, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1825), the fiction of "malice in law" was created, with no
proof of ill will or lack of honest belief required.
17 Absolute privilege exists in four areas:
1) For legislators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6: "[Fjor any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place." Many state constitutions have similar
provisions for state legislators.
2) For persons involved in judicial proceedings. See, e.g., Hayslip v. Wellford, 195 Tenn.
621, 263 S.W.2d 136 (1933), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 911 (1954) (grand juror); Dunham v.
Powers, 42 Vt. 1 (1868) (petit juror); Massey v. Jones, 182 Va. 200, 28 S.E.2d 623 (1944)
(witness); Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220 (1868) (judge).
3) For persons in executive government offices. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959) (lower federal officers and employees making authorized communications in the
performance of their duties); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster General).
4) When plaintiff explicitly consents to the libel. See, e.g., Shinglemeyer v. Wright, 124
Mich. 230, 82 N.W. 887 (1900).
18 Newspapers may report records of public proceedings, even though defamatory,
provided their report is accurate. See, e.g., Cresson v. Louisville Courier-Journal, 299
Fed. 487 (6th Cir. 1924) (report of majority of congressional committee).
In the private arena, an individual has the right to verbal self-defense. Israel v. Portland
News Publishing Co., 152 Ore. 225, 53 P.2d 529 (1936). Statements furthering the interests
of a third party where some duty to make the communication exists will be privileged.
Toogood v. Spyring, 1 C.M. & R. 181, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044 (Ex. 1834). Discussion by a
group of mutual interests is privileged. See, e.g., Slocinski v. Radwan, 83 N.H. 501, 144
At. 787 (1929) (congregation members discussing morals of their minister).
19 See, e.g., Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837 (1943).
20 See, e.g., Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (magazine article writer).
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sports figures, 21 entertainers, 22 and others whose activities or beliefs
make them public figures. 23 Under this rule, error as to opinion is
privileged, but, in a majority of jurisdictions, error as to fact is not.24
The obvious policy of the rule is to encourage open discussion and
criticism of issues and people in the public eye, albeit with factual
accuracy rigorously required. Further justification lies in the notion
that most people who might be defamed under the rule have voluntarily
exposed their works or themselves in certain capacities to the public.
Their reputations are, to some extent, public property.
The most significant limitation on this and other defeasible privi-
leges is the intent with which the defamer publishes his remarks. A
showing of malice, that the defendant published his remarks out of
ill will for the plaintiff, will generally defeat the privilege. Similarly,
defendant's disbelief in his own opinions, excessive vehemence in his
defamation, or unnecessary communication of the remarks to persons
having no legitimate interest in them, all work to defeat the privilege.
The plaintiff must show that defendant abused the policy behind the
privilege, that is, that the defendant was not attempting to obtain
truth for his readers by open discussion of public issues and public
figures.2 5
In the Times case, the Court decided that such limited privilege,
combined with the basic elements of falsity and defamatory harm, did
not sufficiently protect the freedom of the press to report on public
issues and to comment on the activities of public officials. 26 Although
aware that the defendant's advertisement2 7 contained several factual
21 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Publishing Co., 45 Wash. 2d 262, 273 P.2d 893 (1954)
(jockey's handling of horse).
22 See, e.g., Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901) (singer-
dancer).
23 See, e.g., Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1950) (alternative
holding) (proponent of vivisection).
. 24 The minority rule of nine states established in Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711,
98 Pac. 281 (1908), permits good faith error as to fact. See note 15 supra.
25 In a more general statement of the rule: "One who upon a conditionally privileged
occasion publishes false and defamatory matter of another abuses the occasion if he
does not act for the purpose of protecting the particular interest for the protection of
which the privilege is given." RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 603 (1938).
26 The Court alluded to the unequal treatment afforded government officials, who have
an absolute privilege to libel, as compared to that afforded the press: "It would give public
servants an unjustified preference over the public they serve, if critics of official conduct
did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials themselves." 376
U.S. at 282-83.
27 Plaintiff in the Times case was the police commissioner of Mongomery, Alabama,
who was allegedly libelled in a full-page advertisement concerning racial disturbances in
that city.
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errors, the Court considered the case "against the background of a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.1 28 On this basis, the Court
proceeded to attack the sufficiency of truth as a test for libel. The Court
noted that robust debate cannot avoid misstatements of fact and re-
quires that untruths be tolerated to give "breathing space" to free
speech;29 to force all critics of government to be completely accurate as
to facts would in effect impose "self-censorship" on publishers. 30 The
Court concluded that the "accuracy as to facts" rule closely resembled
in effect a law for seditious libel,31 in that it could well quash all con-
troversial comment on government and its officials. 3 2
The Court then turned to the second element-harm to reputation.
Assuming that the statements in the Times advertisement sufficiently
identified the plaintiff and defamed him,33 the Court found irrelevant
the question of harm to his reputation as a public official. 34 It reasoned
that to allow such harm as grounds for recovery would, again, take on
the character of a prosecution for seditious libel. That harm to the
official's private reputation might ensue was recognized by the Court
but was given little weight on the policy scales of the first amendment.
In a sense, the Court was creating a "deep-pocket" theory of defama-
tory harm to reputation; the government can afford defamatory criti-
cism because of its very publicness, and because of its opportunity and
resources to right the harm through ability to reply.35
While the Court's decision in Times did not end the significance of
28 376 U.S. at 270. Speaking of this policy two years later, the Court said: "The thrust
of New York Times is that when interests in public discussion are particularly strong, as
they were in that case, the Constitution limits the protections afforded by the law of
defamation." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
29 "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if
the freedoms of expression are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to
survive,' NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 ...." 376 U.S. at 271-72.
30 Id. at 279. The Court cited Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
31 376 U.S. at 279. Earlier the Court noted that: "Although the Sedition Act was never
tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history."
Id. at 276. See also Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning
of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. RiV. 191, 209.
32 The threat of enormous damage awards of itself would deter any substantial
criticism. The Court noted that the Times advertisement was the subject of five civil
suits with damage claims totalling $3,000,000. 376 U.S. at 277-78 n.18.
33 The Court subsequently found the identification element wanting. Id. at 288-92.
34 "Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that
would otherwise be free than does factual error." Id. at 272.
35 Id. at 304-05 (concurring opinion).
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truth and defamatory harm in the test for libel of public officials, it
forcefully indicated their inadequacy as insulators of a constitutionally
desirable degree of uninhibited discussion. Thus, while truth and
defamatory harm were retained as thresholds which must be met to
put the statement inside the common law boundary of libel, the Court
in Times added a third-"actual malice"-as another independent
hurdle in a multi-threshold test designed to increase protection of first
amendment freedoms.
As defined in Times, "actual malice" 36 exists when a statement is
shown to have been made "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. '37 Mr. Justice Brennan,
the author of the Times opinion, later noted: "The underpinning of
that qualification (actual malice) is the 'redeeming social value' test." 38
Thus, opinions based on facts known to be false or recklessly asserted
are without redeeming social value and need not be constitutionally
protected. While negligent misstatements of fact are equally harmful,
the Court gave them leeway pursuant to its announced policy of grant-
ing "breathing space," or overprotecting all speech to protect that which
is of value.
In addition, the new actual malice threshold greatly altered the
impact of the truth element in this area of libel law. Now that the
plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant knowingly or reck-
36 The phrase was borrowed from the Coleman rule, cited by the Court as a precedent
for the Times decision. Id. at 280-82. The Coleman rule, however, permitted an action
based on misstatements of fact when plaintiff proved the publisher's lack of "good faith"
as to the truth of the facts reported. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723, 98 Pac.
281, 285 (1908); see note 15 supra.
37 376 U.S. at 280. The new definition also has the effect of erasing the old "ill will"
definition of malice, as the Court emphasized in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964),
a criminal libel case in which a district attorney was charged with libeling eight parish
Criminal District Court judges. The Court did not rule unconstitutional all criminal
libel statutes, but said that the Times version of actual malice was required in all such
cases.
Professor Emerson, quoted favorably in Garrison, 379 U.S. at 69, finds no justification
for any criminal libel statute in light of his distinction between actions and words:
"[T]he harm to be prevented is the action, in the nature of disorder or similar conduct,
which it is feared may flow from the utterance. In this, it [criminal libel] differs from civil
libel where . . . there was no action distinct from the communication itself which could
be intercepted by regulation ... [Thus] criminal libel prosecutions cannot be classified
as 'action.' The prior balancing in favor of protecting expression . . . here compels
acceptance of the legal doctrine that criminal libel laws are invalid." Emerson, supra note
1, at 924.
38 Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amend-
ment, 79 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 18-19 (1965). "[The malice requirement] eliminates only ex-
pression which is of limited social value. Deliberate publication of misinformation, it is
assumed, serves no useful purpose. In fact, it is a disservice to the public." Berney, Libel
and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1, 53 (1965).
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lessly published untruthful defamatory remarks, the Court has in
effect shifted the burden of proof with regard to truth; it will be very
difficult for a plaintiff to prove malice without first proving the falsity
of the statement in question. Hence, of the "three 'galloping presump-
tions' of damage, falsity, and malice,"3 9 at least two, falsity and malice,
have been harnessed.
It should be noted that Times has affected only a portion of libel law
and does not even cover the full scope of situations to which the fair
comment privilege applies. Subsequent cases, however, have expanded
the definition of "public official" to such an extent that the multi-
threshold test of Times may ultimately replace fair comment alto-
gether.40 Such a result would substantially reduce the number of libel
suits and would greatly enlarge the scope of social criticism through
the press. But whatever the breadth of its future application, the central
thrust of the Court's approach in Times remains. The new test adds a
third and independent threshold to those already in existence, establish-
ing a multi-threshold test further to protect the public interest in free
and open discussion of public officials.
II. PORNOGRAPHY PER SE, PRURIENT APPEAL, AND PANDERING
Obscenity law as it has evolved from the Court's 1957 decision in
Roth has focused on three elements-patent offensiveness, harmful
effect on audience, and the distributor's intent-which may be viewed
as establishing a multi-threshold test analogous to that developed for
libel in Times. In obscenity, as in libel, the three part test has been
applied to determine what speech is within the protection of the first
amendment and what may be regulated. 41 Parallels drawn between the
elements of these tests may be used further to evaluate the multi-
threshold approach to speech problems.
The first threshold in obscenity is that the publication must be in-
trinsically indecent, regardless of its use or its audience. "[S]ex and
obscenity are not synonymous." 42 The standard was clarified in Manual
39 KaIven, supra note 31, at 196.
40 See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 883 U.S. 75 (1966) (appointees of elected town park
commissioners); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (Sth Cir. 1966)
(famous scientist); Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 35 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum)
(famous scientist); Walker v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231
(W.D. Ky. 1965) (famous general); cf. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America,
Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (company executive in union dispute); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
87 Sup. Ct. 534 (1967).
41 "We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech
or press." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
42 Id. at 487.
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Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,43 where it was held that materials had to be
"patently offensive" in order to be found obscene. Without this initial
threshold test, the Court argued, many of our most respected works of
art and literature would be taken from the reading public. "[S]uch a
construction (of the statute) . . . would doubtless encounter constitu-
tional barriers." 44
The "effect" element constitutes the second threshold.45 Material is
obscene when, "to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest."4 The Court is concerned here with the
effect that obscene materials have on their audience-the harm which
the legislature is presumably attempting to prevent through its imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions.47 As in defamation, the publication must
be taken as a whole, a reaction against the old rule of Regina v. Hick-
lin.48 A second reaction to the Hicklin test is the requirement that
prurient appeal be measured by the standard of the "normal person." 49
This standard also reflects the Court's decision in Butler v. Michigan,50
43 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962) ("Material is obscene if,... it goes substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in describing... such matters (sex)." Accord, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191-92
(1964).
The element was introduced to avoid making a determination of prurient appeal to a
specific audience. See text accompanying notes 52-53 infra. The Court held that the
materials had to be "patently offensive" to the national community.
44 370 U.S. at 487.
45 Id. at 484.
46 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
47 Professor Emerson, in discussing the social harm caused by obscenity, uses his
words-actions distinction to reject the justification for regulation that obscenity leads to
antisocial conduct or unpopular morals. However, he does find some harm where children
receive the materials, and "where a shock effect is produced by forcing an 'obscene'
communication upon a person contrary to his wishes, the issue is somewhat similar
to that involved in private defamation. The harm is direct, immediate, and not controllable
by regulating subsequent action." Emerson, supra note 1, at 938.
Professors Lockhart and McClure define the harm element as the nourishing of "erotic
fantasies" or "psychic autoeroticism." Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The
Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 65 (1960).
Professor Kalven lists four possible evils that might flow from obscenity. He finds three
set aside by the Court and the fourth, "the arousing of revulsion and disgust in a non-
captive audience," as "too trivial a predicate for constitutional regulation." Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 41-42. Whether he would agree
with Emerson about harm to children and captive adult audiences is not stated.
48 [1868] 3 Q.B. 360. The Hicklin test allowed a court to pick out the most offensive
passages and judge the entire publication on their appeal to those persons most suscep-
tible to them.
49 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
50 352 U.S. 380 (1957). "The State insists that, by thus quarantining the general reading
public against books not too rugged for grown men and women in order to shield
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in which a state law banning for all readers any books tending to
influence minors adversely was held unconstitutional. The first amend-
ment does not allow abridgement of the freedom to listen for everyone
when there is reason only to regulate for a few.
Just as libelous statements must be found defamatory in the eyes of
those to whom they are addressed, publications in obscenity litigation
must be shown to be "obscene" in the eyes of their audience. In this
respect the Court continued to be tied to the idea of a national audience
as a result of Butler and Roth until the 1966 cases, 51 where, in the
Mishkin decision, the Court adopted the Lockhart and McClure con-
cept of "variable obscenity:"52
We adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities
by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed
in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable
recipient group. 53
The adjustment of the audience rule not only introduced social reali-
ties; it also helped the Court to find something obscene for the first
time since the Roth case was decided. The Court realized in obscenity
what the law of libel has recognized for a long time-that the materials
have their ill effect not in the abstract, but in the eyes of their recipi-
ents.
The flip side of the prurient interest coin, the "privilege" in obscen-
ity law,54 is the requirement that the publication in question be "utterly
without redeeming social value."55 The "social value" test has greater
juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the general welfare. Surely, this
is to burn the house to roast the pig." 352 U.S. at 383.
51 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964). But lower federal courts had
already made some efforts to employ a variable obscenity test, with some confusion. See,
e.g., United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. One Carton
Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled "491," 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
52 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 47 at 77- "Under variable obscenity, material is
judged by its appeal to and effect upon the audience to which the material is primarily
directed. In this view, material is never inherently obscene; instead, its obscenity varies
with the circumstances of its dissemination." The Court did not rule out the possibility
of finding materials obscene in a neutral context, but its reversal in Memoirs and the
results of Ginzburg and Mishkin indicated the improbability of such a judgment in the
future.
53 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966).
54 Kalven, supra note 47, at 15: "[T]he Court is giving a constitutional privilege to all
communication that has some social value."
55 Book named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966). See also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). For pur-
poses of this analysis, social value is regarded as a part of the ill effect threshold, although
it must be remembered that the rule requires the social value criterion to be determined
independently of prurient appeal.
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force than a privilege in defamation, however, in that it is an element
that must be proved in addition to prurient appeal in order to meet the
ill effect threshold. Recognizing that much literature can be found to
appeal to someone's prurient interest,56 the Court has built in this
safeguard to further isolate those materials it deems socially harmful.
Any publication that in some way contributes to art, literature, or
thought is protected, regardless of its appeal to prurient interest. "Cease-
less vigilance" must be employed to protect open discussion of "sex,
a great and mysterious motive force in human life ... indisputably
... a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is
one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern."57
Hence, a state may not ban materials for advocating sexually provoca-
tive ideas.58 Nor may a novel with even minimal literary value be
banned.59 The Court has apparently extended the same kind of protec-
tion to literature and the arts that it gave to political discussion in
Times; 0 Professor Kalven's plea that "beauty has constitutional status
too" appears to have been heard.61
Before 1966 the question of intent had never played a very important
role in obscenity prosecutions, simply because the Court was usually
concerned with whether the materials in question were to be banned,
and not with the fate of the publishers and distributors. The so-called
"social value" privilege had been absolute,62 the burden falling on
56 "[O]ne would not have to travel far even among the acknowledged masterpieces in
any of these fields literature, art, and science] to find works whose 'dominant theme'
might, not beyond reason, be claimed to appeal to the 'prurient interest' of the reader or
observer." Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
57 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1957).
58 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of New York,
360 U.S. 684 (1959) (movie based on Lady Chatterley's Lover portraying adultery as a
good thing).
59 Book named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 463 (1966).
60 The groundwork for this position was laid in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 501 (1952), quoting favorably from Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948): "The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protec-
tion of that basic right [a free press]. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda
through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine."
Similarly in Times the Court declared: "Like . .. obscenity, . . . libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment." 376 U.S. at 269.
For a narrower view, restricting the scope of the first amendment to "religious and
political freedom," see Meiklejohn, What Does the First Amendment Mean?, 20 U. Cm.
L. Rnv. 461, 464 (1953).
61 Kalven, supra note 47, at 16.
62 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The Court never reached the question
of the intent of the movie distributor convicted below, because it found the movie itself
not obscene.
Cognitive Dissonance in the First Amendment
the prosecution to show that the materials had no social value. The
Court's only word on the subject of intent came in Smith v. California,63
where a bookseller was convicted of selling obscene literature under a
state absolute liability statute. The Court held the statute uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it would require all sellers to be closely
familiar with the contents of all their books and to become their own
censors. To avoid risk of prosecution, sellers would probably take many
books off their shelves that might conceivably run afoul of the obscenity
statute, thus depriving the public of much worthwhile reading. The
Court ruled that any such statute would have to include some element
of scienter, although it did not specify how this provision should be
drawn. The requirement of a mens rea element here is not as a limit to
privilege, as in defamation, but rather as a further protection for dis-
tributors of materials dealing with sex. In this sense the Court's use of
the intent element was similar to its use in Times: rather than making
the defendant prove good intent to justify his actions, the defendant's
mens rea becomes a third, independent threshold for the prosecution
to meet.
III. "COMMERCIAL ExPLoITATION": A NEW ELEMENT
The 1966 obscenity cases subverted the thrust of the multi-threshold
test. The Court began in Memoirs where, after finding the controver-
sial novel Fanny Hill not obscene in a neutral context, it delivered the
following dictum:
Evidence that the book was commercially exploited for the
sake of prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other values,
might justify the conclusion that the book was utterly without
redeeming social importance.64
In its holding, the Court relied on the point that evidence at trial had
shown the novel to have "some" redeeming social value. Its dictum
suggested that the novel could be the subject of further prosecutions
should evidence arise of distributors marketing the book solely on its
"prurient appeal." In clarifying this point, the Court stated:
It is not that in such a setting the social value test is relaxed
so as to dispense with the requirement that a book be utterly
devoid of social value, but rather that, as we elaborate in Ginz-
burg v. United States, post, . . . where the purveyor's sole
emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his publica-
tions, a court could accept his evaluation at face value.65
63 861 U.S. 147 (1959).
64 383 U.S. at 420.
O5 Ibid.
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The suggestion from Memoirs was iterated in the Court's analysis
in Mishkin. The Court first made the adjustment of the audience re-
quirement mentioned above and determined that the materials them-
selves appealed to the prurient interest of the "intended and probable
recipient group," independent of defendant's pandering.60 It then
considered evidence of intent or "commercial exploitation," including
defendant's instructions to authors and artists preparing material for
his books67 and the fictitious names printed in place of his own as
publisher. The Court considered this evidence for two reasons: to estab-
lish scienter within the Smith holding, and to add further evidence
of the prurient appeal of the materials. With respect to the latter,
the Court inferred from the evidence of defendant's instructions to
his authors and artists that he intended his materials to be sold to
sexual deviates. This inference was based on the premise that no one
else would buy this sort of material. At the same time, the Court
referred to the Memoirs dictum in deciding that the defendant's evalua-
tion of the material helped to determine whether the material in fact
appealed to the prurient interests of its recipients.
In Ginzburg, the Court's entire attention was on the element of in-
tent or "commercial exploitation." The Court assumed without decid-
ing that Ginzburg's three publications68 could not be proved obscene
standing apart from the context in which they had been sold. In fact,
in the case of one publication, the Handbook, the Court admitted
that an earlier distribution to a list of physicians and psychiatrists had
been of some social value. 69 However, the Court found that Ginzburg
had played up the "sexually provocative" aspects of the publications in
his advertising circulars. 70 Small portions of the advertising had noted
the social value of the publications, but the Court rejected this as mere
66 The Court made no mention of the patent offensiveness threshold or of the social
value element, perhaps because petitioner argued in his defense to the allegation of
prurient appeal that his publications "instead of stimulating the erotic, . . . disgust and
sicken." Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966).
67 Defendant instructed his authors to write about "unusual sex . . . very strong
d . . early spelled out." Id. at 505.
68 The publications were: EROS, a hardcover magazine; Liaison, a bi-weekly newsletter;
and The Housewife's Handbook to Selective Promiscuity. See Ginzburg v. United States,
383 U.S. 463 (1966).
69 "The Government does not seriously contest the claim that the book has worth in
such a controlled, or even neutral, environment." Id. at 472.
70 Ginzburg had mailed them through the post office in Middlesex, N.J., having failed
to get mailing privileges at Intercourse and Blue Ball, Pa. He had made reference to
recent liberalization of the law of obscenity which allegedly made distribution of the
publications possible and had promised a refund should the Post Office hold them up.
Id. at 467-70.
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"pretense. ' 71 It inferred that Ginzburg had intended the publications
to be bought solely for their prurient appeal. The Court concluded:
We perceive no threat to First Amendment guarantees in thus
holding that in close cases evidence of pandering may be pro-
bative with respect to the nature of the material in question
and thus satisfy the Roth test.7 2
The Court added that it was not banning the publications per se: "All
that will have been determined is that questionable publications are
obscene in a context which brands them as obscene ....",3
The hint in Ginzburg, as well as in Memoirs, is that pandering enters
the equation when the social importance of the materials is at a
minimum, a fact which presumably indicates a "close case." 74 Mishkin
suggests that it should lend weight to evidence of prurient appeal. This
would tend to narrow the problem, although from all the Court tells
us in Ginzburg, evidence of pandering may relate to the determination
of the patent offensiveness threshold as well.
IV. THE INTENT THRESHOLD RE-EXAMINED
While evidence of intent in the 1966 cases was employed in several
ways that are not clearly distinguished by the Court, three principal
uses may be distilled from the opinions: (1) to shift the burden of proof
with regard to determination of the audience; (2) to shift the burden of
proof with regard to one or all of the three elements relating to the
intrinsic nature of the materials in question-patent offensiveness,
prurient appeal, and social value; (3) to determine scienter and establish
intent as a third threshold in the obscenity test.
The first application of evidence of intent finds support from Pro-
fessors Lockhart and McClure, who argue that the burden of proof
should turn on the intrinsic nature of the materials.7 5 The more intrin-
sically pornographic the materials, the more important are the circum-
stances in which they are sold. A book of established literary merit will
71 Id. at 470.
72 Id. at 474.
73 Id. at 475. The likelihood remains that the conviction of pandering publishers will
effectively deter reputable publishers and sellers from marketing the publications
involved, absent an express declaration by the court of their inherent non-obscenity. See
The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARV. L. Rzv. 91, 191 (1966).
74 The "close case" requirement for consideration of evidence of pandering is also
criticized: "As a practical matter, this is a limitation that does not limit. When the
standards themselves are as many and as vague as those now constituting obscenity law,
a close case can only be what a court says it is." Note, More Ado About Dirty Books,
75 YALE L.J. 1364, 1388 (1966).
75 Lockhart & McClure, supra note 47, at 81-83.
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cast the burden of proving a susceptible primary audience heavily on
the prosecution, regardless of the circumstances of distribution.7 6 But
for books on the borderline, evidence concerning the means of dis-
tribution will alter the burden of proof. Thus, while a seller of good
repute will be presumed to be selling to mature audiences:
[I]f the dealer is one of little or no repute, who handles along
with the Miller novels only girlie and nudist magazines and
other books predominantly sexual in nature, law enforcement
officials will certainly make use of this evidence and the dealer
will then have difficulty proving that his audience for the
Miller book is not a sexually immature one.77
In Ginzburg and Mishkin, the Court pounced upon this suggestion
with enthusiasm. In both cases, upon circumstantial evidence of vary-
ing persuasiveness, the Court appears to have determined the nature of
the audience solely on the basis of evidence of the publisher's intent. No
effort was made in Ginzburg, for example, to ascertain whether or not
the recipients of the advertising might take the publisher's claims to
social importance seriously and buy the Handbook in a sincere effort
to improve sexual relations with their spouses. In addition, it is unclear
whether the burden of proof there was shifted as a result of the intrinsic
pornographic nature of the literature or because the Court had found
evidence of pandering. Because no determination was ever made as to
the patent offensiveness of the materials, it would appear that the
Court may have relied solely on Ginzburg's advertisements to establish
the nature of the primary audience to which the materials would
ultimately be sold. Under the implications of this rule, the publishers
of advertisements for any number of films and books could conceivably
find themselves in serious trouble.7 8
Far more troublesome was the Court's second use of evidence of
intent. As first introduced in the Memoirs dictum, the new intent ele-
ment went directly to the social value test. Essentially, the Court said
that any slight literary value a given writing of minimal social value
may have is negatived when that writing is exploited in a way that
appeals solely to prurient interest and ignores the literary value. Sim-
ilarly, in Mishkin, the Court said that evidence that the publisher
thought of his books as appealing to the prurient interest of their
intended recipients may help determine the fact of their prurient
76 Id. at 83. The authors refer to Lady Chatterley's Lover as an example of such a book.
77 Ibid.
78 Consider, for example, the standard newspaper advertisement used for Federico Fel-
lini's film 8j, which portrayed a man with a long whip surrounded by curvaceous Italian
starlets.
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appeal.7 9 In both instances, the intent of the publisher helped to estab-
blish the ill effect threshold and may have been determinitive of the
appeal of the materials to their audiences.80
In all three cases, the intent element functioned to shift the burden of
proof with respect to the ill effect threshold.81 Introduction of evi-
dence of pandering created an inference of the ill effect of the publica-
tions on their audience, shifting the burden to the defendant to prove
his materials did not appeal solely to prurient interest and did in fact
have social value for their primary recipient group.82 This application
of intent fully contradicts the first purpose of such evidence, to deter-
mine what the primary audience will be so that the questions of pruri-
ent appeal and social value may be measured in terms of that audience.
The Court has indicated, however, that the prurient appeal and social
value of the materials as understood and intended by the publisher-
seller will be identical to the effect the materials have on their primary
audience. Such an inference should have no more foundation in ob-
scenity than it does in libel, where the plaintiff is required to prove that
the third party understood the statements in question to be defama-
tory.83 The harm guarded against in obscenity law is the effect on
sexually immature audiences of materials appealing solely to prurient
interest.84 If such ill effect cannot be proved, then it would appear that
Ginzburg and Mishkin are in jail merely for harboring bad intentions.8 5
70 "[A]ppellant's own evaluation of his material confirms such a finding (prurient
appeal)." 383 U.S. at 510.
80 One comment seems to find relevant to the question of prurient appeal proofs based
on the proposition "that a book is more likely to arouse a reader erotically if it is
presented as a book that ought to arouse him erotically." The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
80 HAxv. L. Rav. 91, 189-91 (1966). While the probative value of such evidence is some-
what doubtful, see text accompanying notes 83-84 infra, even should it be admissible, there
is the danger arising from the 1966 decisions that it will be relied on exclusively in the
determination of troublesome cases.
81 In one, Ginzburg, intent may also have shifted the burden of proof for the patent
offensiveness threshold. As with prurient appeal, there may be some probative value in
such evidence, but the danger that it may weigh too heavily in the determination of this
threshold militates for its exclusion.
82 Again, the burden appears to shift not on the basis of the intrinsic indecency of the
materials, but on the evidence of pandering alone.
83 In defamation cases, this determination is often made with the aid of testimony of
selected recipients of the communication as to what effect the communication had on
their regard for the plaintiff.
84 The necessity that the ill effect be a direct result of the words written is emphasized
by Emerson in his words-actions distinction. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 922 (1963).
85 Note, More Ado About Nothing, 75 YALE L.J. 1364, 1379 (1966). It has been suggested
that such actions could be prosecuted as a criminal attempt. See Friedman, Mr. Justice
Brennan: The First Decade, 80 HAxv. L. Rxv. 7, 13 (1966).
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In a sense, the Court has treated the social value test as a defeasible
privilege, ignoring its previous role as an independent element of the
ill effect threshold. Hence, a finding of wrong intent should not have
negatived this element in the same way that it negatived fair comment
in libel where the privilege operated as a further defense in addition
to the thresholds of the standard test. In defamation, even before Times,
the courts had to find that the communication was false and defamatory
before they could find for the plaintiff. The defendant's intent was
irrelevant. When intent was introduced in Times, the Court was careful
to preserve the independence of the three thresholds, requiring that
each be separately proved before permitting recovery.8 6
The third application of evidence of intent, as a proof of scienter, is
the only one functionink as an independent threshold like the intent
element in Times. As used in Mishkin, evidence that the publisher
knew he was appealing solely to the prurient interest of an immature
audience is sufficient to determine the constitutional requirement of
scienter set out in Smith.8 7 Unlike the other two applications of evi-
dence of intent in these cases, this has no effect in determining the
first two thresholds of the obscenity test. Were this to be the sole use of
evidence of intent, the test for obscenity would be a truly multi-
threshold test.
What the history of libel law and the pre-1966 obscenity cases have
illustrated is that where the legislature and the courts seek to regulate
forms of speech, there is no single test that can accurately define that
which is to be excluded and at the same time grant adequate protection
to that which is socially useful and desirable. In Smith it was found that
a standard of absolute liability unduly restricted freedom of the press.
In Manual, the Court argued that proof of appeal to prurient interest
was too broad; that materials had to be shown patently offensive as well.
In Jacobellis and in Memoirs, the Court required that materials be
utterly lacking in social value and hence appealing solely to prurient
interest. The 1966 decisions represent a rather startling reversal of the
pattern by allowing a single element, "commercial exploitation," to
permeate and possibly dominate the entire test. The use of a single-
threshold test, one that depends entirely on the intent of the defendant,
endangers the constitutional right of free speech by broadening the
range of prosecutions permitted 88 and thus drastically altering the
course set by the Court over the past decade.
86 For support of the principle of independent proofs of the elements of obscenity, see
19 STAN. L. REv. 167, 181 (1966).
87 The Court quotes the interpretation of the scienter element by the New York court
as the "calculated purveyance of filth." 383 U.S. at 510.
88 "It is of course true that in some circumstances variable obscenity may effectively
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V. Times v. Ginzburg: SOME DISTINCTIONS
Having applied the threshold approach of libel to obscenity, it is
necessary to point out some significant differences between the two
areas of law and the way in which the multi-threshold test affects them.
While the similarities between the two based on their common founda-
tion in the first amendment are striking, their individual peculiarities
lend force to the conclusion that obscenity defendants should, at the
very least, be given the same protection that is now given in libel law.
It is significant initially to note that the defendant won in Times,
while in two of the three obscenity cases the publishers were con-
victed. In instituting the "variable obscenity" theory in Ginzburg and
its two companion cases, it is strikingly apparent that the Court con-
sidered the cases against a background markedly different from that in
Times, where the overriding emphasis was on further protection of
speech. Perhaps this attitude of restraint reflected in the new decisions
was caused by an unarticulated desire on the part of the Court to
redraw the boundaries of obscenity law in order to obtain more con-
victions.8 9
However, a more persuasive reason for this different perspective may
be that the Court takes a more protective attitude toward communica-
tions involving politics than toward communications dealing with
sex. With the issues of seditious libel and censorship by the govern-
ment of its critics lurking in the background, the Court had little
difficulty in coming to the defense of an institution such as the New
York Times in a somewhat spurious libel suit. The defense of a New
York smut salesman has less appeal to judicial sensibilities. Whereas
free and open political debate is an absolute essential of the demo-
cratic system, it is more difficult to find a comparable compulsion for
wide-open discussion of sex. Yet in Burstyn the Court conceded no
constitutional difference between entertainment and the reporting of
politics,90 and it would therefore appear that the law calls for equal
treatment of these two areas of speech.
A significant difference between libel and obscenity is that in libel
one is generally dealing with ideas and the reporting of facts, while in
obscenity litigation the materials are questioned for the form in which
they present themes or images; the courts are dealing with questions
of tastes and esthetics in obscenity, not with accuracy as to facts and
deprive the sexually immature, including some harmless old men, of material that in
other circumstances would not be obscene and might even have great social importance."
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 47, at 84.
89 See 45 TEXAs L. REv. 1382, 1389 (1966).
90 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); see note 60 supra.
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opinions. Many writers and artists are attempting to convey images
through their work, the final impression of the work being created in
the mind of the individual recipient.91 In this context, the notion of
"social value" is somewhat inimical to the issues at hand. Despite
the Court's effort to make social value interchangeable with "literary
or scientific or artistic value,"92 it is obviously extremely difficult to
determine whether a given primary audience finds a magazine utterly
without social (literary) value;93 what may be of literary value to the
uneducated man may be utterly worthless to the Ph.D.94 Where the
critical questions turn on the means and form of expression rather than
its content, there is a clear danger of turning the rule into a "gentle-
men's privilege," where an educated court and expert witnesses may be
unable to see what some may regard as literary merit. Certainly under
the rules of Ginzburg and Mishkin, where social value was determined
by the circumstances of distribution, such discrimination against those
with less sophisticated literary tastes is inevitable. The conclusion to
be drawn from these considerations involving the inherent difficulty of
determining what is obscene is that the test for such a determination
should be overbroad in order sufficiently to protect marginal materials.
In fact, there would appear to be more compelling reason for building
this prophylactic protection into an obscenity test than there is for its
existence in a libel formula since the more objective nature of libel
determinations make them less prone to error.
The last point that sets obscenity apart from libel is that in Ginzburg
91 Defining "work of art" as a viewer's perception of and response to an art object,
Professor Kaplan says "obscenity is a property of the resultant work and not of the object
out of context." Kaplan, Obscenity as an Esthetic Category, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
544, 545 (1955).
92 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
93 Indeed, how does one go about defining "appeal to prurient interest" when dealing
with a group of sexual deviates? See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 491 (1966).
94 Concomitantly, Shakespeare must be deemed to be totally lacking in social or literary
importance to those unable to comprehend his works.
Also worth noting here is the data developed by the (Kinsey) Institute for Sex Research
"showing that, generally, better educated persons are more responsive to pornography
because they are more imaginative and better able to conceptualize than persons of low
social and educational status; the latter are less likely to get excited about a picture with
which they can 'do nothing.'" Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1966 Sup.
CT. REv. 7, 65-66.
For the argument that pornography may be a useful medium for modem writing see
Michelson, Apology for Pornography, The New Republic, Dec. 10, 1966, p. 21.
It is interesting to note that the social value test is implicit in Times whereas it is
explicit in obscenity law. The relatively objective Times rule tends to exclude materials
of no social value but does not use that rather vague term as a criterion of the test. See
note 38 supra and accompanying text.
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a man was sent to prison for five years; in Times, a newspaper was
threatened with a money judgment. The fact that much of obscenity
law involves criminal prosecution and the possibility of a prison sen-
tence would seem to demand that the defendant's right to free expres-
sion be as fully protected as possible, for not only is a source of
expression being restricted, but its publisher is being imprisoned.
Thus it is probable that pressure on publishers to observe a safer
margin will result in the operational illegality of legitimate materials
dealing with sex because of the threat of greater sanctions.9 5
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Any constitutional test for obscenity must focus on the protection
of expression concerning sex that is of only marginal value in order to
protect that of real importance. It is always easy to find zealous censors,
less easy to find those who will support speech unpopular with the
majority.9 6 To counteract this tendency, the Times opinion offers an
admirable model.
The difficulties with defining a clearcut rule for obscenity are mani-
fold. The standards of the community toward discussion of sexual
matters change so rapidly that any rule must be subject to almost con-
tinuous re-evaluation. Standards vary so widely among groups in
society that what shocks one person bores the next and is a source of
"psychic autoeroticism" to yet another. Moreover, any judgment as to
the obscenity of a work necessarily involves subjective determination
of the taste with which it was written. The danger here, of course, is
that the tastes of one group will be imposed on others. Finally, it is
difficult to identify and to measure the social and individual harm
the law wishes to punish.97 It is perhaps for some of these reasons that
Justices Black and Douglas have been moved to vote for the uncon-
stitutionality of all obscenity regulation.
But a persistent majority of the Court has insisted on the constitu-
95 One comment refers to this as the "chilling effect." The Supreme Court, 1965 Term,
80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 193 (1966).
96 See Emerson, supra note 84, at 887-93. "A system of free expression can be successful
only when it rests upon the strongest possible commitment to the positive right and the
narrowest possible basis for exceptions. And any such exceptions must be clear-cut,
precise and readily controlled. Otherwise the forces that press toward restriction will
break through the openings, and freedom of expression will become the exception and
suppression the rule." Id. at 889.
97 See generally United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 812-17 (2d Cir. 1956) (appendix to
concurring opinion of Frank, J.); Cairns, Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assump-
tions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV. 1009 (1962);
Lockhart & McClure, supra note 47; ST. JOHN-STEVAS, OBscENITY AND THE LAw (1956). See
also note 47 supra.
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tionality of some regulation of pornographic materials. Again, Times
offers an admirable model for the construction of a rule. The rule must
overprotect all speech to protect that which is valuable. The test must
rely on the most objective elements possible. It must be as precise as
possible, both to serve notice on those who may be criminally prose-
cuted and to guarantee consistency in the courts. For these purposes, the
multi-threshold test in Times seems most suitable. The Court should
first require determination of whether the material is inherently
indecent. Here, it would be better not to apply the variable obscenity
theory,98 but rather to judge the offensiveness of the material by con-
temporary national standards as in Roth and Manual. Second, the test
should include an ill effect or harm threshold, which will define what
about the material is harmful enough to put it beyond first amendment
protection. If this harm is the titillation of sexually immature minds,
it should be so stated. In this instance, it is sensible to again borrow
from libel law in judging the effect by determining its impact on the
actual primary audience. Evidence of the intended audience may be
helpful here, but surely not conclusive. A counterbalance to the ill
effect element should be required proof that the material has no value
to the primary audience other than its capacity to bring about~the harm
or ill effect proscribed. The third independent threshold should be the
intent of the publisher or distributor of the materials to exploit the
weakness of the primary recipient group for the particular ill effect
defined.9 9 This element should be independent and should not be a
tool for determining or redirecting the burden of proof for either of the
other two thresholds. The defendant must have known that the primary
recipient group was susceptible, that the material would have the ill
effect defined upon the group, and that members of the group would
buy the material primarily to receive the defined ill effect.
Such a test is not altogether inconsistent with Ginzburg and its com-
panion cases. Virtually every portion of this test is suggested by one or
more of the Justices. What is basically different, and what is crucial
to the success of the test, is that each threshold be independent of the
other two.
98 See ndte 52 supra.
99 An alternative might be a showing that the defendant was utterly without "esthetic
intent." Cf. Kaplan, supra note 92, at 548.
